Abstract-Encodings, that is, injective functions from words to words, have been studied extensively in several settings. In computability theory the notion of encoding is crucial for defining computability on arbitrary domains, as well as for comparing the power of models of computation. In language theory much attention has been devoted to regularity preserving functions.
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to define computability of number-theoretic functions through computational models that operate on strings of symbols from an alphabet Σ (rather than defining computability directly via recursion schemes) one usually employs (number) representations, that is, injective functions r : N → Σ * . A function f : N → N is called r-computable (computable by a Turing machine using representation r) if there exists a Turingcomputable function ϕ : Σ * → Σ * such that ϕ • r = r • f . For representations r that are informally computable (i.e., there is a machine-implementable algorithm that always terminates, and computes r), it can be argued on the basis of Church's thesis (similar as e.g. in [21, p. 28] ) that r-computability does not depend on the specific choice of r, and coincides with partial recursiveness.
Shapiro [26] studied the influence that (unrestricted) bijective representations r have on the notion of r-computability. He found that the only functions that are r-computable with respect to all bijective representations r are the almost constant and almost identity functions; and that there are functions that are not r-computable for any representation r. Furthermore, he defines 'acceptable' number representations: a bijective representation r is called 'acceptable' if the successor function lifted to the r-coded natural numbers is Turing computable. He goes on to show that, a representation r is acceptable, if and only if r-computability coincides with partial recursiveness.
In this paper we focus on the notion of computability by finite automata of sets of natural numbers. In particular, we investigate how number representations determine the sets of natural numbers that are computable by finite-state automata. Such sets are called 'recognizable': a set S ⊆ N is called r-recognizable (recognizable with respect to representation r), if there is a finite automaton that for all n ∈ N decides membership of n in S when r(n) is given to it as input.
We are interested in comparing representations r with respect to their computational power as embodied by the r-recognizable sets. This idea gives rise to a hierarchy via a subsumption preorder between representations: r 1 : N → A * subsumes r 2 : N → B * if all r 2 -recognizable sets are also r 1 -recognizable. There are several natural questions concerning this preorder; to name a few:
(i) When does a number representation subsume another?
(ii) Is the hierarchy proper: do there exist representations r 1 and r 2 such that r 1 subsumes r 2 , but not vice versa? (iii) Is there a representation that subsumes all others? (iv) Is every (injective) number representation subsumed by a bijective number representation? (v) What classes C ⊆ ℘(N) of sets of natural numbers are recognizable with respect to a number representation? As our computational devices are finite automata, all of these questions boil down to problems in language theory. In particular the comparison of number representations is intimately connected with encodings, injective mappings from words to words, that have the property that their image function preserves regularity of languages. For bijective number representations f : N → A * and g : N → B * , we have that f subsumes g if and only if the set function
preserves regularity of languages; here we use the notation h[ ] to denote the image function of a function h. Regularity preserving functions play an important role in different areas of computer science, and have been studied extensively. An important result in this area is the work [17] , [15] For bijective word functions we experienced this to be a very challenging question, which to the best of our knowledge, has remained unanswered in the literature. Using the results of [17] , [15] , it can equivalently be formulated as follows:
Are there bijective functions f : Σ * → Σ * such that f is uniformly continuous, but f −1 is not uniformly continuous in the profinite topology?
Concerning recognizable sets and the hierarchy of number representations, the question translates to:
Are there bijective number representations f and g such that f strictly subsumes g?
If this were not the case, subsumption would imply equivalence for bijective number representations, and the hierarchy would collapse.
Our main result (Theorem 8), which allows us to answer all of the above questions, is the following:
Main Theorem. For every countable class L ⊆ ℘(Σ * ) of languages over a finite alphabet Σ, and for every alphabet Γ with |Γ| ≥ 2, there exists a bijective encoding f :
With respect to computability theory and recognizable sets of natural numbers, this result can be restated as follows:
As a direct consequence, when allowing for arbitrary bijective number representations, we find the unsought:
Finite automata are as strong as Turing-machine deciders.
( ) That is, there is a bijective representation such that finite automata can recognize any computable set of natural numbers. Our result also has consequences in the context of the work by Boker and Dershowitz on comparing the power of computational models, as described below. Models over different domains are typically compared with the help of encodings that translate between different number representations. In order to prevent encodings from changing the nature of the problem, they are usually required to be 'informally algorithmic', 'informally computable', or 'effective' (see e.g. [21, p.27] ). However, the latter concepts are rather vague, and in any case non-mathematical. Therefore they are unsatisfactory from the viewpoint of a rigorous conceptual analysis.
In the formal approach for comparing models of computation proposed by Boker and Dershowitz in [3] , [5] , [4] 
(In order to highlight the encoding used, M 1 ρ M 2 is written.) Although encodings are not required to be (informally) computable, this approach works quite well in practice. However, in analogy to what we found for recognizability, one runs into the anomaly ( ) again, namely when comparing the power of decision models with the preorder . Our main result implies C DFA for every countable class of decision problems C, where DFA denotes the class of deterministic finite-state automata. Even stronger, it follows that there is a bijective encoding ρ such that C ρ DFA. As a consequence we obtain that TMD ρ DFA holds for the class TMD of Turing-machine deciders, and a bijective encoding ρ.
Further Related Work
For a general introduction to automata and regular languages we refer to [22] , [9] . We briefly mention related work with respect to regularity preserving functions apart from work [17] , [15] of Pin and Silva that we have already discussed above. The works [27] , [10] , [14] , [23] , [11] , [24] , [13] investigate regularity preserving relations; in particular, [24] provides a characterization of prefix-removals that preserve regularity. In [16] , Pin and Sakarovitch study operations and transductions that preserve regularity. In [12] , Kozen gives a characterization of word functions over a one-letter alphabet whose preimage function preserves regularity of languages. The paper [2] by Berstel, Boasson, Carton, Petazzoni and Pin characterizes language preserving 'filters'; a filter is a set F ⊆ N used to delete letters from words of the language as indexed by elements of the filter.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We use standard terminology and notation, see, e.g., [1] . Let Σ be an alphabet, i.e., a finite non-empty set of symbols. We denote by Σ * the set of all finite words over Σ, and by ε the empty word. The set of infinite sequences over Σ is Σ N = {σ | σ : N → Σ} with N = {0, 1, 2, . . .}, the set of natural numbers. A deterministic finite-state automaton (DFA) is a tuple A = Q, Σ, δ, q 0 , F consisting of a finite set of states Q, an input alphabet Σ, a transition function δ : Q×Σ → Q, an initial state q 0 ∈ Q, and a set F ⊆ Q of accepting states. The transition function δ is extended to δ
for all states q ∈ Q, letters a ∈ Σ and words w ∈ Σ * . We will write just δ for δ * . A word w ∈ Σ * is accepted by A if δ(q 0 , w), the state reached after reading w, is an accepting state. We write Lang(A) for the language accepted by the automaton A, i.e., Lang(A) = {w ∈ Σ * | δ(q 0 , w) ∈ F }. A DFA with output (DFAO) is a tuple Q, Σ, δ, q 0 , Δ, λ , with the first four components as in the definition of a DFA, but with, instead of a set of accepting states, an output alphabet Δ, and an output function λ : Q → Δ. A DFAO A = Q, Σ, δ, q 0 , Δ, λ realizes a function mapping words over Σ to letters in Δ; we denote this function also by A, that is, we define A : Σ * → Δ by
A DFA Q, Σ, δ, q 0 , F can thus be viewed as a DFAO Q, Σ, δ, q 0 , {0, 1}, χ F where χ F is the characteristic function of F ; instead of a state being accepting or not, it has output 1 or 0 respectively.
Two automata A and A over the same input alphabet Σ are equivalent on a set X ⊆ Σ * if A(x) = A (x) for all x ∈ X. We use this functional notation also for a DFA A, stipulating:
A partition P of a set U is a family of sets P ⊆ ℘(U ) such that ∅ ∈ P , A∈P A = U , and for all A, B ∈ P with A = B,
The pigeon hole principle (PHP) states that if n pigeons are put into m pigeonholes with n > m, then at least one pigeonhole contains more than one pigeon. PHP for infinite sets is that if infinitely many pigeons are put into finitely many holes, then one hole must contain infinitely many pigeons.
Let A, B, X, and Y be sets, with
is regular whenever L is a regular language.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we prove our main results. We work towards Theorem 8 stating that for every countable class L of languages there exists a bijective encoding f :
We first prove the existence of injective encodings with (a weakening of) this property (Lemma 2), and then strengthen this result to bijective functions (Lemma 6). From Theorem 8 we then obtain the existence of bijective functions that are regularity preserving but not regularity reflecting, Theorem 9.
For injective encodings we do not require that the images f [L] are regular. For our construction, we use the weaker property that f [L] is recognizable among f [Σ * ]. This means that there exists an automaton that for every w ∈ Σ * , on the input of the code f (w) decides whether w ∈ L. This leads to the notion of 'relatively regular in' which also is crucial for recovering the 'fiber lemma' for c-automatic sequences, see Lemma 26 . 
Without loss of generality we assume
For every i = 1, 2, . . ., we construct a DFAO A i and show that
for all j ∈ {0, 1} and a ∈ Γ,
For lifting the result of Lemma 2 from injective to bijective encodings, we need some preliminary notions and results. Definition 3. Let U be a set and I, C ⊆ U . The set C is attracted to I if C ⊆ I whenever C ∩ I is finite. For a partition E of U , we say that E is attracted to I, when, for every C ∈ E, C is attracted to I.
Equivalently, E is attracted to I if every finite C is included in I and every infinite C has an infinite intersection with I. 
is attracted to I, where, for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}, j ∈ {0, 1} ,
Proof. We start with A = A, and repeatedly adapt A (and therewith E ) until E is attracted to I, in such a way that equivalence with A is upheld.
Assume that E is not attracted to I. Then there exist i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} and j ∈ {0, 1} such that C i,j \ I = ∅ but C i,j ∩I is finite. Without loss of generality, assume that j = 0.
is infinite by assumption. By the pigeonhole principle (for infinite sets) it follows that C i,1 ∩ I is infinite. Since C i is a regular set and A is a finite automaton, it follows that C i,0 is regular as it is the intersection of two regular sets. As C i,0 ∩ I is finite, also C i,0 \ I is regular. As a consequence we can change the finite automaton A to accept the words in C i,0 \ I (and otherwise to behave as before). This adaptation preserves equivalence, and we now have that C i,j is attracted to I for j = 0, 1, since, after the adaptation, C i,0 ∩I = C i,0 and C i,1 ∩I is infinite. We repeat the procedure until C i,j is attracted to I for every i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} and j ∈ {0, 1} .
The following lemma, Lemma 6, is a key contribution of our paper. It states that every injection f : A → Γ * (with A some countably infinite set) can be transformed into a bijection
is a regular language whenever f [L] is relatively regular in the image f [A]. Before proving the lemma, we sketch the construction. We construct g as the limit of a sequence of adaptations of f . Roughly speaking, we make f 'more bijective' in every step. We let
. . be an enumeration of A, and -w 0 , w 1 , w 2 , . . . be an enumeration of Γ * . The idea is that we change the target of arrows such that all words w i for i ∈ N become part of the image. For every natural number n = 0, 1, 2, . . . we will pick (while avoiding repetitions) a word v kn (for k n ∈ N) from the input domain and then adapt f by stipulating v kn → w n . Then, in the limit, every word w ∈ Γ * will be in the image. (In order for the limit of the adaptation to be a function, we also need to guarantee that every v kn will be picked precisely once.)
Figure 1 sketches an injective function f ; an arrow from
The crucial point of the construction is the following: when changing arrows, we need to ensure that ( ) the limit of the process preserves relative regularity. Note that for bijective functions g :
is regular. Thus if we can ensure ( ), the resulting bijective function g will have the desired property.
How to pick the v kn for ensuring ( )? Let A 0 , A 1 , A 2 , . . . be an enumeration of all finite automata over the alphabet Γ. We write u ∼ n v if for every i < n, the automaton A i accepts the word u if and only if it accepts the word v. We then pick for every natural number n ∈ N, a word v kn such that f (v kn ) ∼ n w n (and the word v kn has not been picked before). In other words, we pick v kn such that the first n automata A 0 , A 1 , . . . , A n−1 cannot distinguish f (v kn ) from the image w n after the adaptation v kn → w n . This choice guarantees that every automaton A i (i ∈ N) is only affected by a finite number of adaptations, namely the first i transformation steps. For every further adaptation (j > i), the behavior of the automaton A i is taken into account for the choice of v kj , and as a consequence the modification v kj → w j preserves the acceptance behavior of A i . Then for the limit g of the adaptation process we have for almost all n ∈ N that A i accepts f (v n ) if and only if A i accepts g(v n ). In order to guarantee that every v i will be picked eventually and that the adaptation preserves injectivity, we pick among the suitable candidates for v kn the one which appears first in the enumeration w 0 , w 1 , . . ..
Remark 5.
There is a caveat here that we will ignore in this sketch of the construction. We actually need to make sure that a word v kn with these properties exists. To ensure this, the equivalence classes with respect to ∼ n must be attracted to the image of f . This is in general not the case, but we can employ Lemma 4 to adapt the automata outside of the image of f . We refer to the proof of Lemma 6 for the details.
We explain this process at the example of the function f given in Figure 1 . For the first step n = 0, we want to adapt f such that w 0 becomes part of the image of f . Note that the relation ∼ 0 relates all words of Γ * . As a consequence we can pick any word v k0 . We choose v k0 = v 1 since the image f (v 1 ) appears first in the sequence w 0 , w 1 , . . ., and we adapt the function f by v 1 → w 0 . The result of this first adaptation is shown in Figure 2 . For the second step (n = 1) we want that w 1 becomes part of the image. Now ∼ 1 relates words that have equal behavior with respect to acceptance by the automaton A 0 . The numbers 0 and 1 below the words w i in Figure 2 The result of the second adaptation is shown in Figure 3 . Now n = 2 and ∼ 2 relates words that have equal acceptance behavior with respect to automata A 0 and A 1 . To this end, we now write A 0 (w i ) A 1 (w i ) below each word w i in Figure 3 . The word w 2 is accepted by A 0 but rejected by A 1 . The only (displayed) candidate for v k2 exhibiting the same behavior is f (v 2 ). The result of this third adaptation is shown in Figure 4 . This process continues for every n ∈ N, and the limit of this process is a bijective function g with the desired properties. The construction is made precise in the proof of Lemma 6.
Lemma 6. Let A be a countably infinite set. For every injection
is a regular language.
. . be an enumeration of the set A, and let -w 0 , w 1 , w 2 , . . . be an enumeration of the set Γ * , and let -A 0 , A 1 , A 2 , . . . be an enumeration of all finite-state automata over Γ.
We abstract away from the domain by defining c :
In this proof, will construct a bijective function d :
is a regular language. Then we can define the function g :
The bijectivity of g follows immediately from bijectivity of d, and for every
is regular. As a consequence, it suffices to construct a function d with the properties above.
For each i ∈ N we will define a finite-state automaton A i with properties described below. For every n ∈ N, we define the equivalence relation
for all u, u ∈ Γ * . So ∼ n relates words that are not distinguished by the automata A 0 , A 1 , . . . , A n−1 . The relation ∼ n gives rise to a partition
We are ready to carry out the central construction.
We first describe what objects we will define and their main properties. Then we give specifications of these objects, and afterwards we show that the objects are well-defined and that the properties hold.
We are going to define, by induction on n ∈ N, (i) a natural number k n ∈ K n , where
(ii) a bijective map d n : N → I n , where
We will now give specifications of (i)-(iii), and thereafter show that they are well-defined, and satisfy the above mentioned properties.
(i) We define k n ∈ K n as follows:
where min denotes the minimum with respect to the order < on Γ * given by the enumeration
(iii) For A n we choose the automaton A guaranteed to exist by Lemma 4 where the lemma is invoked with A = A n , I = I n+1 , and E = E n . We note that ∼ 0 = Γ * × Γ * , and, by definition of ∼ n , it follows that E n is finite and every C ∈ E n is a regular language. (2) We prove that (i)-(iii) are well-defined, and that the following properties hold:
We first show that, for every n ∈ N, items (c) and (d) follow from (a) and (b). (c) We show that d n : N → I n is bijective. Surjectivity of d n is immediate by definition of I n . To show injectivity, assume there exist
From (a) and the definition of d n , it follows that either
. By injectivity of c we have
We note that, indeed, (1) follows by the choice of k n . We now prove (a) and (b) by induction on n ∈ N. For the base case we have:
For the induction step, let n ∈ N be arbitrary. We assume c[K n ] ∩ W n = ∅ and that E n is attracted to I n (induction hypothesis). We first prove the implication
If
We have to prove that E n+1 is attracted to I n+1 . We first
show that
By injectivity of c we have
Let C ∈ E n be arbitrary. By induction hypothesis we know that C is attracted to I n ; we distinguish the following two cases:
Hence, by (3) we have w n = c(k n ) and so I n = I n+1 . This concludes the proof of (4). Recall that A n is the automaton A obtained by invoking Lemma 4 with A = A n , I = I n+1 , and E = E n . Both requirements of the lemma are established above, in (2) and (4), so the automaton A n is well-defined. Let 
. Thus k will be picked eventually.
We define the encoding d :
These limits are well-defined since, for every i ∈ N: there exists n ∈ N with i = k n , and we have d m (i) = c(i) for all m ≤ n and d m (i) = w n for all m > n. From the above, it follows that the function d has the following property:
We now show that d is indeed a bijection. 
By the above construction we have for all w ∈ I m w ∈ Lang(A m ) ⇐⇒ w ∈ Lang(A m ) .
By definition, I m coincides with c[N] for all but finitely many words. Hence for almost all
By the definition of d, and property (1), we find:
Due to ∼ n ⊆ ∼ m for every n ≥ m, we obtain that
and hence, since N = {k n : n ∈ N} holds, that
Hence for almost all n we have
⇐⇒ n ∈ L by (6).
As d is bijective, we obtain
for almost all w ∈ Γ * . Hence d(L) differs only by finitely many elements from a regular language and is consequently itself regular.
The following proposition states that, under certain conditions, the bijective function g constructed in Lemma 6 is computable. Obviously, the injective function f that is lifted to g must be computable to start with. Moreover, we need to be able to decide for regular languages whether their intersection with the image of f is empty, finite or infinite. This enables us, in case of a finite intersection, to compute this intersection, and to decide whether the equivalence classes E n are attracted to the image of f (and I n ). This suffices to ensure computability of g constructed in the proof of Lemma 6. We strengthen the statement of Theorem 9 by extending it to the preservation of membership in countable classes of languages that include the regular languages. For this, we use the following stipulation. For an arbitrary set S of languages over A, we say that a function F : Proof. Let S = S ∪ {X} where X is a language not in S. By Theorem 8 there exists a bijective function f :
IV. CONSEQUENCES FOR COMPARING MODELS OF COMPUTATION
It turns out that our main results have some remarkable consequences in the context of comparing computational models using concepts proposed by Boker and Dershowitz in a series of publications [3] , [5] , [4] . The authors summarize their goal as follows:
"We seek a robust definition of relative power that does not itself depend on the notion of computability. It should allow one to compare arbitrary models over arbitrary domains via a quasi-ordering that successfully captures the intuitive concept of computational strength. [. 
To prevent codings from participating too strongly in the simulation of a computation on a machine M 1 through a computation on a machine M 2 (and thereby from substantially alleviating, for the simulating machine M 2 , the task that is solved by the simulated machine M 1 ), codings are usually required to be computable in some sense. Frequently, one of the following two restrictions are stipulated (see for example Rogers' classic book [21, p.27,28] ): (1) Codings must be 'informally algorithmic', 'informally computable', or 'effective' in the sense that they can be carried out by an in principle mechanizable procedure. (2) Codings are required to be computable with respect to a specific model, for example by a Turing machine. Boker and Dershowitz reject such prevalent stipulations:
"Effectivity is a useful notion; however, it is unsuitable as a general power comparison notion. The first, informal approach is too vague, while the second can add computational power when dealing with subrecursive models and is inappropriate when dealing with non-recursive models." [4] As a consequence, they go on to use classes of encodings that do not constrain (at least not explicitly) the cost that is (i) encodings (injective functions) without any additional requirement; (ii) encodings that are 'decent' with respect to the simulating model M 2 that shoulders the simulation, in the sense that M 2 is able to recognize the image of the coding; (iii) bijective encodings.
We will show that each of these concepts admits some quite counterintuitive consequences. At first these anomalies pertain only to decision models, the subclass of all models that only obtain 'yes'/'no' as computation result. But it turns out these phenomena apply also to more broad classes of models.
In order to formally state our results, we repeat here the basic definitions in [5] , [4] , and extend them by straightforward adaptations for decision models.
By abstracting away from all intensional aspects of models of computation that concern mechanistic aspects of stepwise computation processes, Boker and Dershowitz define a model extensionally as an arbitrary set of (extensionally represented) partial functions over some domain. We define decision models as models of computation consisting of total functions that yield a definite 'yes'/'no' answer. For codings ρ between decision models it could be desirable to demand that ρ(0) = 0 and ρ(1) = 1. We do not to take up this restriction, for a pragmatic reason connected to the definition of 'simulation' immediately below. If namely a nonconstant function f in a decision model M 1 is simulated via ρ by a function g in a decision model M 2 , then it follows that either ρ(0) = 0 and ρ(1) = 1, or ρ(0) = 1 and ρ(1) = 0. In both cases it can be said that decisions taken by f are faithfully modelled by corresponding decisions taken by g.
, F 2 be models of computation. Let ρ be a coding from D 1 to D 2 . We define:
(i) For g ∈ F 2 and f ∈ F 1 we say that g simulates f via ρ if g • ρ = ρ • f holds, as in the following diagram:
The 'decency' requirement for codings mentioned before is defined as follows in [4] . There, Boker stresses that this requirement follows classic definitions of computable groups by Rice [19, p. 298 We note that according to Definition 15 a coding ρ can be decent with respect to a decision model
Since ρ is injective, |D 1 | ≤ 2 follows, and so M 1 can only be a rather trivial model. Therefore we adapt the notion of decency in an obvious way to accommodate decision models. With the concepts 'model of computation' and 'simulation' defined, Boker and Dershowitz introduce three comparison preorders for models, which are based on three classes of codings as mentioned above. In addition to the preorder induced by decent codings, we also define a variant preorder induced by decent * codings.
, F 2 be models of computation. We define: With these definitions in place, we are now able to state, and prove, our results concerning the comparison of decision models. Let Γ be an alphabet with {0, 1} ⊆ Γ. We write DFA(Γ) = Γ * , D for the decision model corresponding to DFAs, so with D the set of characteristic functions of regular languages over Γ, that is,
The model TMD(Γ) over input alphabet Γ of Turing-machine deciders is defined analogously. The proposition below is an easy consequence of Lemma 2.
Proposition 18. Let Σ, Γ be alphabets, where {0, 1} ⊆ Γ.
Then for every countable decision model M with domain
holds, that is, deterministic finite state automata with input alphabet Γ are at least as powerful as M.
Proof. Every decision model M = Σ * , F with domain Σ * and with countable set F of computed functions corresponds to the countable set
, for all f ∈ F. Now it is straightforward to verify that ρ is a coding between the domains of the models M and DFA(Γ) that facilitates the simulation of every f ∈ F by a function g : Γ * → {0, 1} that denotes the acceptance/non-acceptance behavior of a deterministic finite-state automaton with input alphabet Γ. This shows (8) . Proof. The main statement follows from Proposition 18. That ρ cannot be computable can be seen as follows. Suppose that ρ is computable. Let A 0 , A 1 , . . . and w 0 , w 1 , . . . be recursive enumerations of all finite automata and words over Σ. Then the
This statement can be strengthened to a bijective, and therefore (see the proof) also decent * , simulation with finitestate automata by using Lemma 6 and Theorem 8. 
where DFA id (Γ) is the extension of DFA id (Γ) by adding the identity function id : Γ * → Γ * . Sequential finite-state transducers FST(Γ) (see e.g. [22] ) over alphabet Γ form a natural computational model that extends DFA id (Γ). Thus for an alphabet Γ with {0, 1} ⊆ Γ we also obtain the very counterintuitive result:
that is, sequential finite-state transducers are at least as strong via a decent coding as every countable decision model. (Here we consider finite-state transducers that are able to recognize the end of a word.) In particular, every Turing-machine decider can be simulated by a sequential finite state transducer via a decent coding.
Remark 22. These results raise the question, whether these anomalies only concern decision models. In particular, one may wonder whether the comparison of computational models avoids counterintuitive results when additional requirements are imposed on the models that are compared. A candidate requirement would be to enforce that the output of the models must have an infinite range. Or, even stronger, we could require the following property: A class of models M = D, F is image-complete if for every non-empty computable set
Let T = Σ * , F consist of all Turing machines such that for every f ∈ F we have there exists a finite set L f ⊆ Σ * and for all x ∈ Σ * we have f (x) ∈ {x}∪L f ∪{⊥} . Thus functions f ∈ T map words either to themselves or into a finite set that may depend on f . The class T is a natural model because it can be implemented by a recursively enumerable set of Turing machines 3 . Note that T is a strict extension of Turing-machine deciders and it is an image-complete model. This can be seen as follows: Let I ⊆ Σ * be any non-empty computable set. Let i ∈ I and define the function f : Σ * → Σ * for all x ∈ Σ * by:
Then the model T can be simulated by two-way sequential, finite-state transducers [8] via decent codings:
We have already argued that the Turing-machine deciders can be simulated by FST(Γ). This can easily be generalized to a finite number of output words L (finite-state transducers can output words instead of only symbols). Now we assume that one symbol w ∈ L symbolizes the identity output; then the two-way finite-state transducer, instead of producing this output word, can walk back to the beginning of the input and reproduce the input word as output word.
Our results suggest that there are definite limitations to the concepts of power comparison for models of computation by Boker and Dershowitz. These concepts have an 'absolute' flavor insofar as they do not formulate any explicit constraints on the computability of encodings used for simulations. The counterintuitive consequences pertain primarily to decision models (yet this is a blurry concept, see Remark 22) , and do not extend to models that include all partial-recursive functions (see Corollary 24 below ). Yet they demonstrate that these comparison concepts lack the desired robustness.
We note that our results are not the first indications of anomalies. In [5, Example 5.1] Boker and Dershowitz show that Turing-machine deciders are not a complete model of computation, in the sense that this model can be strictly extended to incorporate a non-recursive set. Our results strengthen this example naturally in the following three ways: (i) to bijective, and decent encodings, (ii) to use finite automata instead of Turing-machine deciders, and (iii) to arbitrary countable models as extensions. This is because, as we have shown, finite automata can be extended, via decent codings, to any countable decision model, and consequently the same holds for Turing-machine deciders. Hence, even decent encodings facilitate the simulation of all Turing-machine deciders by finite automata, more precisely, by finite-state transducers.
The following theorem is an easy consequence of the concepts developed by Shapiro in [26] . He calls a number representation r : N → Σ * acceptable if it is bijective, and if the successor function succ : N → N can be simulated by a Turing machine on the representations, that is, if the lifting succ r : Σ * → Σ * of succ with the property:
is Turing computable. While certainly more investigation is needed, we also interpret our results as follows. For comparing the computational power of models of computation over different domains, it is crucial to make clear how computational power should be measured for the purpose at hand. After having settled on a reasonable measure, this measure can then be used to constrain the computational power of admissible codings that may act as a trustworthy intermediary between the models.
V. CONSEQUENCES FOR GENERALIZED AUTOMATICITY
Finite-state automata can be used to generate infinite sequences, see [1] . This is usually done using the standard base-k representation (n) k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k−1} * of the natural numbers n ∈ N. A sequence σ ∈ Δ N is called k-automatic if, for some deterministic finite-state automaton A with output (DFAO, see
This concept has been generalized in several ways, where different number representations are fed to the automaton, see, e.g., [25] , [20] , [7] . This motivates the study of automaticity with respect to arbitrary number representations, which is part of work in progress of the present authors with Clemens Kupke, Larry Moss, and Jan Rutten. We briefly comment on the relation with Cobham's Theorem [6] , which states that a sequence is ultimately periodic if and only if it is both k-and -automatic for multiplicatively independent k, ∈ N. For example, if a sequence is both 2-and 3-automatic, then it is ultimately periodic. As Cobham Furthermore we have shown that this result has a number of noteworthy consequences in language theory for regularity preserving functions, in computability theory for a concept for comparing the power of models of computation, and in the theory of automatic sequences for a generalization of this concept with respect to arbitrary number representations: (B) In the sense of [5] , finite-state automata are as powerful as any countable decision model (e.g., Turingmachine deciders) (Proposition 18). This even holds for the strongest notion of comparison in [5] , namely that with respect to bijective encodings (Corollary 20). Similar counterintuitive consequences also affect computational models beyond decision models.
(C) For every countable class C of sets of natural numbers there is a bijective number representation r : N → Σ * such that every set S ∈ C is r-recognizable (i.e., there is a finite automaton deciding membership n ∈ S on the input of r(n)) (Corollary 29). More generally, for every countable class S ⊆ Δ N of infinite sequences over a finite alphabet Δ, there exists a bijective number representation d : N → Γ * such that every σ ∈ S is d-automatic (Corollary 30).
These results also answer the questions in Section I concerning the hierarchy of number representations. From (A) it follows that the hierarchy is proper: there are bijective representations r 1 and r 2 such that r 1 subsumes r 2 , but not vice versa. From (C) it follows that every countable class C ⊆ ℘(N) of languages is contained in the countable class of all r-recognizable languages, for some representation r. Moreover, (C) implies that every injective number representation is subsumed by a bijective number representation, and that no representation subsumes all others, since the class of r-recognizable sets of natural numbers is always countable.
We conclude with two questions:
-How far can computable bijective f : Σ * → Γ * extend the class of recognizable languages, that is, what classes
is a regular language} can we obtain for a computable bijective f ? For example, is there a computable (bijective) encoding that makes precisely all context-free languages recognizable? -Rigo [20] describes a class of number representations that characterizes the morphic sequences. Our results entail the existence of a bijective representation r : N → Σ * such that every morphic sequence is r-automatic. Is there a computable bijective representation r such that precisely the morphic sequences are r-automatic?
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